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or capital formation. Instead, they suffered from “Euroscierosis.
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are gratefully acknowledged.Currency Appreciation and “Deindustrialization”: A European Perspective
The rise in the value of the U.S. dollar in the early 1980’s and its subsequent
fall were surrounded by arguments that a currency appreciation depresses a
country’s industrial and traded goods sectors and that a depreciation would boost
these sectors. In the U.S. case, the argument was made that the 1980-85
appreciation of the dollar “deindustrialized” the country, or that America lost
its international competitiveness. The antidote, according to this argument, was
to engineer a decline in the dollar to boost U.S. competitiveness.t The
international counterpart to this argument was that foreign nations, including
Europe, gained competitiveness in the early 1980’s, only to lose it after 1985
when their currencies appreciated.
This article examines the arguments surrounding this view and some evidence
on whether there is such an inverse link between a country’s exchange rate and
its international competitiveness. It first reviews an alternative hypothesis
that movements in the value of a country’s currency, to the contrary, reflect a
positive relationship to the country’s competitiveness. Earlier discussions of
this hypothesis have focused more heavily on the U.S. experience, especially
‘These arguments are legend. Some influential examples of proponents of
this view, however, include: Branson (1986), Branson and Love (1988), Brinner
(1985), dine (1986), Krugman and Baldwin (1987), Marris (1985), Meyer (1986),
Peterson (1987) and Solomon (1985).
1during the period of the rise in the dollar.2 While less widely discussed, this
alternative hypothesis recently has been put forward by former Federal Reserve
Chairman Paul Voicker in his book with Toyoo Cyohten: “I may be old-fashioned
about this, but I have never been able to shake the feeling that a strong
currency is generally a good thing and that it is typically a sign of vigor and
strength and competitiveness” (1992 p. xv).
This article focuses on some European evidence, especially from the period
when the dollar fell (1985 to 1990), or when non-U.S. currencies appreciated.
Specifically it addresses whether European industries were “deindustrialized”
when the dollar fell and European currencies appreciated. It concludes that the
European evidence is also consistent with the view that a rise in the external
value of a country’s currency reflects an improvement in the performance of the
country’s industry or in its competitiveness. Thus European countries gained
competitiveness vis-a-vis the United States when the U.S. dollar fell and
European currencies appreciated, and they had lost it earlier when the dollar
rose.
I. The Rise and Fall in the U.S. Dollar: Is the European Experience
Comnarable?
Since the initiating factor giving rise to the “deindustrialization”
hypothesis was the rise in the value of the dollar, a review of this experience
is necessary for determining whether the experience in Europe is comparable.
Chart 1 shows the movements in the trade-weighted nominal and real exchange rates
2The hypothesis is developed in several papers, including Tatom (1985,
1986a, 1986b, 1987, and 1988). Lawrence (1983 and 1984) was among the first to
cast doubt on the U.S. deindustrialization hypothesis. Click and 1-lutchinson
(1990) argue that the rise in the value of the dollar in 1980-85 was linked to
fiscal stimulus that could have raised the value of the dollar and stimulated
output and employment in the U.S. traded-goods sector.
2for the United States from 1973 to 1991. The dollar rose on both bases from 1980
to 1985, then fell to 1988.~ By 1990, the nominal exchange rate had fallen 35
percent, nearly reversing the 46.3 percent rise from 1980 to 1985; the real
exchange rate (based on consumer prices) also retraced its earlier rise over the
same period.
Movements in the value of the dollar imply opposite movements in non-dollar
currencies. Thus, if a rise in the dollar deindustrializes the United States,
the reversal of this movement should deindustrialize U.S. trading partners.
Whether this hypothesis is relevant for Europe depends on the extent to which
movements in the value of the dollar are mirrored in European currencies.
Since there is no single European currency and, in fact, there have been
several realignments in the European Monetary System (EMS), it is not a simple
task to determine movements in the value of European currencies. One indicator,
however, is the value of the European Currency Unit (ECU). From 1980 to 1985, the
dollar value of the ECU fell 45.2 percent, paralleling the 45.3 percent rise in
the dollar; subsequently, from 1985 to 1990, the ECU rose 67 percent. Thus,
while the dollar almost exactly retraced its earlier movement, the ECU rose from
$0.7622 to $l.2730 per ECU from 1985 to 1990, putting the ECU 8.5 percent below
its $1,391 per ECU average in 1980. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the
rise in the ECU (and its earlier fall) exceeded the comparable U.S. movements.
Thus, if a 45.3 percent rise in the dollar can deindustrialize the United States,
a6 7percent rise in the ECU might equally well be expected to reduce European
competitiveness.
3The trade-weighted value of the dollar actually peaked in the first quarter
of 1985, but the analysis here is unaffected by this difference.
3Table 1 offers a broader view of exchange rate movements, however. On a
trade-weighted basis, no European country had an appreciation in 1985 to 1990 as
large as the previous appreciation of the dollar, on a nominal or real (using
export unit values) basis. Nonetheless, six countries (Germany, Netherlands,
Belgium, Denmark, Switzerland and Austria) showed nominal appreciations of about
10 to 19 percent!’ Six others showed smaller appreciations and 6 depreciated.
Eleven of the 13 countries shown had real appreciations from 1985-90. Over the
earlier period (1980-85), similar numbers of European countries depreciated and
to a similar relative extent compared with the U.S.’s subsequent depreciation.
In particular, 13 of 18 countries had nominal declines and 10 of 13 had real
depreciations. While the changes in the trade-weighted European exchange rates
do not move as dramatically as those for the United States or the value of the
ECU, they still generally conform to the ECU pattern. How should such movements
in exchange rates be interpreted?
II. Two Views of The Link Between The Exchange Rate and Traded Goods Sector’s
Performance
The hypothesis that there is an inverse linkage between a country’s
exchange rate and its industrial performance treats exchange rate movements as
exogenous. When a country’s currency rises (falls) in value, or the exchange
rate rises (falls), domestic prices of imported goods fall and foreign prices of
domestic exports rise. As a result, domestic consumers switch from local,
import-competing goods to foreign suppliers, and foreigners switch from imports
4The relatively larger rise in the value of the German mark against the
other 11 appreciating European nations has been referred to as the German
dominance hypothesis. In this view, a major shift against or in favor of the
dollar vis a vis EMS countries affects the mark most of all. The focus on the
dollar in accounting for EMS country movements is especially important in the
l980s according to one of the hypotheses explained below. The German dominance
hypothesis is explained by Giavassi and Giovannini (1989).
4to their own import-competing sector. The appreciating-currency country loses
production for export and its import-competing sector shrinks, so the traded
goods sector contracts. At the same time, the traded goods sector abroad will
expand; the demand for its import-competing sector rises, as well as for its
exports. This reflects the symmetry of the argument, of course, because these
countries have depreciating currencies. According to this hypothesis, referred
to as the “deindustrialization” hypothesis below, European nations and other
competitors with the United States should have benefited from expanding trade in
the early 1980s and should have lost competitiveness when the U.S. dollar fell
from 1985 to 1990.
What Is ComDetitiveness?
This argument clarifies the meaning of competitiveness as used here.
Competitiveness, to a first approximation, refers to a country’s market share in
world output. This definition ignores the influences of differing natural growth
rates and of distortions arising from domestic subsidies, taxes or regulations;
the former consideration is especially important at an aggregate level because
a country with a declining population and labor force is unlikely to appear
competitive on a market share basis, even if its productivity performance is
superior. Thus, while the latter is a more meaningful measure of a nation’s
relative performance in securing a high or rising standard of living, changes in
competitiveness reflected in relative output are unlikely to yield a different
indicator of competitiveness changes. More importantly, such a definition avoids
the more frequent reliance on movements in trade balances or on real exchange
rates as indicators of movements in a country’s competitiveness. These
5indicators provide a seriously erroneous view of a country’s, or an industry’s,
competitive position.5
For example, a country’s net exports of a product will fall, despite an
increase in domestic production, if its own consumption rises more. A simple
redistribution of world income can result in consumption changes that reduce
world trade, and which reduce trade most in a country that is gaining income.
The latter’s consumption of traded goods could rise relatively more than its
production, so that its net exports fall or its net imports rise. Similarly, a
redistribution of world resources and production can result in a decline in a
country’s net exports, perhaps even in its share of trade, despite an increase
in the country’s absolute output and its share of world production.
Real exchange rate measures are also unreliable indicators of
competitiveness. Such measures frequently rely on consumer price measures, which
are not representative of traded goods. Belassa (1961, 1964) notes the effect
of economic growth in raising consumer price measures relative to traded goods
prices, biasing upward such real exchange rate measures, and giving the false
impression of lost competitiveness in more rapidly growing countries. Lipschitz
and McDonald (1992) provide a recent discussion, following Marston (1986), and
indicate the shortcomings of other real exchange rate measures as indicators of
international competitiveness. They share the view taken here that a measure of
a gain (loss) in competitiveness should reflect a gain (loss) in producers’ share
of both domestic and foreign markets.
5Krugman (1994) raises similar concerns over the concept of international
competitiveness and arrives at similar conclusions. In his case, however, since
productivity or real GDP per capita are not distinctly different concepts from
competitiveness, he rejects any usefulness of a concept of a nation’s
competitiveness.
6Movements in The Exchange Rate Can Reflect A Positive Relationship to
Competitiveness
The alternative view of the exchange rate- competitiveness linkage focuses
on influences that lower (raise) the.relative cost of a country’s traded goods
output, raising (lowering) the rate of return to capital in this sector, and
attracting a net capital inflow into the country. In this case, the rise in the
country’s exchange rate reflects its increased competitiveness.’ A sufficient
condition for this result is the operation of purchasing power parity, so that
a decline in cost in one country (due to a positive productivity or negative
resource price shock, for example) requires that foreign producers’ currency
decline in value to maintain international competitiveness.7
In the context of the monetary approach to exchange rate determination,
policies that boost productivity or capacity output in a country raise the value
of its currency. Such changes in productivity also are associated with changes
in relative rates of return to investment, so that capital flows reinforce the
appreciation of the currency of the country which initially boosted the rate of
return to capital. In this view, movements in the exchange rate reflect
6Since, in this view and generally in economic theory, both the exchange
rate and competitiveness are jointly determined endogenous variables, any
correlation is conceivable depending upon the internal and external shocks
affecting the economy. See Frenkel and Razin (1992), for example. This is the
simplest refutation of the deindustrialization hypothesis. Piggott, Rutledge and
Willett (1985) provide a discussion of a related problem involving the treatment
of the exchange rate as an exogenous variable. Their analysis concerns the link
between the exchange rate and the prices where the currency’s value is inversely
related to future domestic inflation, but the exchange rate might also be viewed
as the cause of a rise in domestic prices.
7Frenkel and Mussa (1985) provide a summary of the state of research on the
validity of purchasing power parity (PPP). At least in the short run, it does
not hold usually. Note that the PPP assumption above is a sufficient condition
used for exposition only. The focus below is on real shocks for which naive
tests of PPP would be expected to fail, especially in the short run.
7movements in competitiveness in the same direction, instead of acting as the
agent for an inverse movement in competitiveness.
Economic policy has a major influence on competitiveness and the exchange
rate. Attempts to boost productivity through increased investment, for example,
typically involve new incentives to invest or anti-inflationary monetary policies
aimed at reducing the cost of capital and raising the private rate of return to
saving. To the extent that such efforts are expected to be successful, the value
of the country’s currency will rise.
This positive linkage is also central to exchange rate policy in countries
that manage their exchange rate. Currency depreciation typically reflects a
willingness to ratify a monetary policy that has been and/or is expected to be
more inflationary than a country’s trading partners. Similarly, a credible
appreciation requires an economic policy that is consistent with lower expected
future domestic prices. Austrian economic policy offers one of the clearest
examples of this relationship; in the mid-1970s and again in 1979, Austria
appreciated the schilling against the Deutsche Mark and a basket of currencies
to signal their intention to adhere to their hard currency policy. To be
credible, policy actions had to support the expectations of slower inflation.8
In the specific example of U.S. developments in the 1980’s, tax law changes
in 1981 reduced the cost of capital in the United States, boosting the rate of
return to capital in the U.S. and raising the cost of capital abroad. These tax
changes included extending the investment tax credit and broadening its coverage
8See Cluck, Proske and Tatom (1992) for a recent discussion of Austrian
exchange rate policy. Winckler (1991) develops the case for signaling policy
changes using exchange rate changes. See also Hochreiter and Winckler (1991) for
an application to Austria. The emphasis in such discussions is typically on
monetary policy, but the analysis can also apply to fiscal policy, where
supply-side effects on productivity can be more direct.
8to shorter-lived assets, allowing expensing for some short-lived capital goods
and substantially shortening the depreciation lives of most capital goods.9 As
a result of such changes, one would expect that U.S. investment would rise,
boosting U.S. labor productivity and output. At the same time, the higher cost
of capital abroad would be expected to retard foreign investment and productivity
and output growth. World investment would be channeled by both U.S. and foreign
investors toward the U.S. and away from foreign markets.
Dissatisfaction with the excesses of U.S. investment, especially in
long-lived structures and very short-lived assets, as well as with the rise in
the value of the dollar itself and with the trade deficit, led U.S. policymakers,
in the first instance, to reverse these fiscal incentives and also to accelerate
monetary growth. Monetary growth accelerated in early 1985, just after policy
discussions of proposed fiscal actions also had begun. The fiscal actions
adopted in the 1986 tax reform act included repeal of the investment tax credit
and substantial lengthening in depreciation lives. Despite a reduction in the
marginal income tax rates, taxes on capital income rose, boosting the cost of
capital sharply.’° For example, corporate tax accruals, net of the Federal
9These tax changes are discussed in Ott (1984). The 1981 and 1986 tax
changes and their effects on international capital flows are also discussed in
Sinn (1988) and Mutti and Grubert (1988). Koester and Kormendi (1989) provide
evidence from 63 countries supporting the hypothesis that marginal tax rates on
income have a negative influence on economic growth. Their marginal tax rate
measures do not include adjustments for some tax changes that affect the marginal
cost of capital and, therefore, investment, like changing depreciation and tax
credit rules.
‘°The maximum combined marginal tax rate on corporate income realized
through reinvested earnings rose from 56.8 percent under the 1981 tax law to 59.1
percent under the 1986 tax reform; the former consisted of a 20 percent capital
gains tax rate and a 46 percent corporate tax rate, and the latter consisted of
a3 9percent corporate rate and a3 3percent personal income or capital gains tax
rate. For corporate capital income realized through dividends, the maximum tax
rate fell from 73 percent in 1981 to 59.1 percent in 1986. The weighted average
maximum marginal tax rate (assuming 50 percent of corporate earnings are
9Reserve, rose 47.3 percent from $58.5 billion in 1985 to $86.1 billion in 1987,
despite only little cyclical improvement in the U.S. economy and nominal GDP
growth of 12.4 percent over the same period.
As a result, the pattern of exchange rates, investment, productivity and
output were expected to reverse, according to this view. In particular, these
changes were expected to raise the U.S. cost of capital and reduce the U.S. rate
of return to capital, lower U.S. investment by domestic and foreign investors,
and lower the cost of capital abroad. The changing pattern of investment could
be expected to lower U.S. productivity and output growth and to raise these
measures abroad, while lowering the value of the dollar or raising the value of
foreign currencies. Thus, a decline in the value of the dollar was expected to
boost European competitiveness, rather than deindustrializing Europe, as the
conventional view might suggest.
III. The U.S. Evidence
Developments in the United States were strongly at odds with the
deindustrialization hypothesis, despite its popularity. Proponents of the
importance of the hypothesis for the United States focus on trade balance
developments. When the dollar rose sharply, the U.S. balance of trade
deteriorated sharply; subsequently it improved as the dollar fell. The
merchandise trade deficit rose from $25.5 billion in 1980 to $122.2 billion in
1985 and to $159.6 billion in 1987; by 1990, it had declined to $108.8 billion.
distributed as dividends) fell from 64.9 percent in 1981 to 59.1 percent. Thus,
the corporate income tax base would have had to effectively rise by only 9
percent for the maximum tax on corporate capital income to have been raised.
This base rose substantially more than this, however, due to the end of the
investment tax credit and lengthened depreciation allowances.
10Virtually all of these changes were concentrated in 5 manufacturing
industries: electrical and transportation equipment, nonelectrical machinery,
primary metals and apparel, according to Tatom (1988). Of the $124.1 billion
overall rise in the merchandise trade deficit, 91.9 percent was concentrated in
these five industries. These industries did not deindustrialize. In fact,
productivity growth in these industries boomed in 1980-85, raising the growth of
overall manufacturing productivity and of real CNP per worker. While this growth
slowed in 1985-87, these industries still registered faster productivity growth
than the rest of manufacturing or real GNP per worker.
This unusual productivity performance was reflected in strong production
gains. Output in these deficit-related industries also boomed in 1980-85,
growing more than twice as fast as the rest of manufacturing and nearly double
real GNP growth. These industries produced an unusually strong overall rise in
overall U.S. manufacturing productivity, capacity and output. The
cyclically-adjusted share of U.S. manufacturing output rose to its highest
post-World War II levels frommid-1981 to 1985.”
The deindustrialization hypothesis also incorrectly interpreted the source
of the dollar’s strength. Proponents of the hypothesis typically cite the rise
in the U.S. budget deficit as the source of interest rate increases which induced
the rise in the dollar, rather than incentives to reallocate world capital.12
ttSee Tatom (1986a, 1986b, 1987, 1988). Tatom (l986a and 1988) show that
there is a positive and statistically significant leading relationship between
an increase (decrease) in the trade-weighted value of the U.S. dollar and
subsequent (3 quarters) increases (decreases) in U.S. manufacturing output, given
cyclical influences on such output. This leading relationship is consistent with
forward-looking foreign exchange markets which anticipate movements in
productivity or competitiveness.
t2The hypothesis that a rise in foreign demand for dollars to buy assets in
the United States was the source of the dollar rise is not easily supported.
While foreigners may have increased their U.S. investment, they would have done
11Such arguments have been unimpeded by the poor fit of the facts and the
argument. For example, the surge in U.S. interest rates occurred well before the
emergence of the U.S. budget deficit. In fact, by mid-1981 interest rates had
peaked, but the total government budget deficit for the year ending in 111/1981
had risen only to $36.2 billion (from a surplus of $15.8 billion two years
earlier). Table 2 summarizes subsequent movements in the budget deficit and the
movements up or down in the value of the dollar and in interest rates over each
interval.
The budget deficit climbed to $179 billion in 1983, while interest rates
generally fell. The budget deficit then fell until early 1985 (to $132.2
billion), without halting the rise in the dollar. Next the budget deficit rose
to $185.3 billion in the year ending in 1/1987, while the dollar fell. Finally,
from its recent low point of $99.6 billion in the year ending in 111/1989, the
total government budget deficit surged to $215.4 billion in 1991, without
resurrecting a rise in interest rates or the exchange rate. Moreover, over these
two years, when the budget deficit more than doubled, the merchandise trade
deficit fell from $115.7 billion to $73.4 billion.
Contrary to the deindustrialization hypothesis, there are only two periods
in Table 2 when the budget deficit and the value of the dollar moved in the same
direction. Moreover, in each of these instances, U.S. interest rates moved in
the opposite direction, contrary to the transmission mechanism hypothesized in
their view. The movements in the table are for the three-month Treasury bill
rate, but other short-term rates, and a real rate constructed by computing the
so in domestic currency. Since this currency bought substantially fewer dollars,
foreign investment in the U.S. did not grow much faster than U.S. income from
1980 to 1985. The source of the dollar appreciation in international
transactions is discussed below.
12quarterly average of the three-month Treasury bill rate less the annualized rate
of increase of the CPI over the next three months, show the same pattern. The
links between budget deficits and interest rates, interest rates and the value
of the dollar, and the value of the dollar and U.S. trade are nearly as poorly
understood, or at least as poorly argued by U.S. deindustrialization proponents,
as that between exchange rates and competitiveness.
Some insight into the changing pattern of international competitiveness can
be obtained from Chart 2 which shows sources of supplies of dollars in
international exchange, measured relative to U.S. GOP. The two principal sources
are U.S. demands for spending on imports and on foreign assets, or U.S.
investment abroad. U.S. assets abroad generally fell from 1980 to 1985, despite
a slight rise during 1982. This reduction in U.S. investment abroad was the
source of a decline in the supply of dollars in international exchange equal to
nearly 2.5 percent of U.S. COP between 1980 and 1985.
The next major swing in Chart 2 was again in U.S. investment abroad, which
increased sharply, pushing up the overall supply of dollars in international
exchange just as the exchange value of the dollar began to fall. Thus, at least
from a U.S. standpoint, shifts of U.S. demand for foreign assets are consistent
with changing incentives to invest in the United States and with movements in the
exchange rate.
Finally, the pattern of U.S. domestic investment is consistent with this
view and not with the deindustrialization hypothesis. Chart 3 show U.S. business
fixed investment as a share of GOP since 1948; periods of recession are
indicated. Both actual and cyclically-adjusted shares are shown. The actual
13share is strongly cyclical, so the cyclically-adjusted share is more
representative of non-cyclical shifts in demand for business capital.13
The cyclically-adjusted share shows that investment surged up in mid-1981
to its highest post-World War II level and remained more than a full percentage
point higher than its early- 1981 level until early in 1986 when tax reform became
effective. The cyclically-adjusted investment share has remained relatively low
since the onset of tax reform and the decline in the dollar.
These changes in the relative strength of business investment have also
been reflected in U.S. productivity performance. Chart 4 shows U.S.
productivity, measured by output per hour in the business sector, since 1959.
Productivity growth was much stronger in 1980-85 than it had been in the 1970s,
but it has stagnated since 1986. This pattern is consistent with the U.S.
investment pattern, but it is precisely the opposite of the productivity
performance suggested by the deindustrialization hypothesis. The rise in the
dollar was supposed to destroy U.S. productivity, according to this hypothesis,
while its subsequent fall was supposed to restore U.S. productivity; exactly the
opposite has occurred.
IV. The European Evidence
Did European competitiveness deteriorate in the late—1980s, when, on
average, the ECU rose as much as the dollar had earlier? Chart 5 shows the share
of European and U.S. trade (imports plus exports) in world trade from 1959 to
1991. The chart shows that Europe’s share of world trade rose sharply in
‘3The cyclical adjustment is based on an estimate of the effect of movements
in the manufacturing capacity utilization rate on the share of investment. The
adjusted series is based on an average utilization rate of about 82 percent,
about the post-World War II average. See Tatom (1989) for a discussion of this
adjustment and of controversies surrounding business investment in the 1980s.
141986-91, but that it had been temporarily depressed in 1981-85. The European
share rose from 41.1 percent in 1985 to 47.8 percent in 1990, following its
earlier decline from 44.1 percent in 1980. This pattern is precisely opposite
that suggested by the deindustrialization hypothesis. Similarly, the U.S. share
fell from 15.5 percent in 1985 to 13.5 percent in 1990, following its previous
rise from 12.4 percent in 1980.
The more relevant measure of competitiveness is the share of world output.
Table 3 shows the growth rates of manufacturing output in the period of
depreciating European currencies (1980-85) and when they generally rose
(1985-90). The data are from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) and include all the European countries used above except
Iceland. In the 1980-85 period, European output growth generally did not exceed
that in the United States; only Luxembourg, Ireland and Portugal showed faster
growth.
In the latest period, there is no evidence of lost European
competitiveness. Four European countries had manufacturing growth that
outstripped that in the United States. More importantly, only 4 of the 16
European countries showed a slowing in output growth in 1985-90 and 11 showed
sharper accelerations than the United States. The six largest European
industrial nations (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Switzerland and the United
Kingdom) showed faster growth than the United States and accelerations in growth
exceeding 2.5 percent per year.’4
141t might be argued that the results reported in this paper are strongly
influenced by business cycle movements. For the United States, however, the
unemployment rate in 1980, 1985 and 1990 was 7.1, 7.2, and 5.5 percent,
respectively. Thus, the 1980-85 period comparison exhibits little cyclical
influence at its end points and the second period shows some cyclical improvement
which should bias the results in favor of the United States. The OECD’s
standardized unemployment rate for Europe fell from 10.4 percent in 1985 to 8.1
15The positive link between the exchange rate and competitiveness suggests
that there should be differences in domestic price performance surrounding the
major changes in exchange rates and competitiveness in the l980s. In particular,
when domestic economic policies boost capital formation, productivity and the
exchange rate, the country, like the United States in the early 1980s, should
have a lower rate of price increase than its competitors. Alternatively, when
foreign economic policies raise domestic capital formation, productivity growth
and the exchange rate, as occurred for Europe from 1985 to 1990, the domestic
inflation rate in the beneficiary country should be smaller, or show a more
favorable development.’5
Table 4 shows the five-year rate of price increase, based on the export
price deflator, for the 18 European countries and the United States. While there
are many other factors that are important for influencing the level and pace of
change of inflation, the data are consistent with the positive
competitiveness-exchange rate linkage. In particular, from 1980-85 the United
States had the lowest rate of price increase shown. In the 1980-85 period,
inflation improved in all of the countries shown, but it improved least in the
United States. As a result, the U.S. rate of export price increase ranked
seventh in 1985-90, rather than first, as in 1980-85. The smaller decline in
percent in 1990, which is a slightly larger improvement than in the United
States. Interpreting movements in European unemployment rates as purely cyclical
is questionable, however. For example, the 1980-85 rise in the unemployment rate
from 6.1 percent in 1980 has been interpreted as largely a rise in the natural
rate. Thus, cyclical movements from 1980 to 1985 and from 1985 to 1990 are
likely to be quite similar in the U.S. and in Europe.
15With fixed exchange rates, a positive productivity shock would be expected
to lower domestic and world prices with money growth rising where the
productivity shock originated and falling elsewhere. With flexible exchange
rates, these price pressures are allowed to show through to the exchange rates
and less to foreign prices and relative money stocks.
16U.S. inflation in the late l980s, or larger decline in Europe, is consistent with
the relative improvement in competitiveness in Europe; both of these changes
reflect, presumably, the alterations in monetary and tax policies noted above.
While inflation (Table 4) and manufacturing growth rate comparisons
(Table 3) suggest that European competitiveness improved while European
currencies appreciated, a better summary measure supporting this conclusion is
the OECD index of European manufacturing output. European members of the OECD
account for 39.5 percent of OECD manufacturing (in 1980), slightly more than the
weight for the United States (36.8 percent).
Chart 6 shows the OECD indexes for European and U.S manufacturing (1980
100 in each case). The chart shows that the relative position of the United
States improved sharply from 1980 to 1985 and that this advantage narrowed later,
particularly when U.S. output stagnated after 1988. In contrast, European output
staged a notable rebound in 1985-90 from its stagnate performance in 1980-85, or
in 1973-85. During the 1980-85 period, European performance was referred to as
“Eurosclerosis.” From 1985 to 1990, European output rose at a 3.1 percent rate,
up from a 0.2 percent rate from 1980 to 1985. Not only did European output
growth not slow, its relatively rapid pace almost caught up with the U.S. growth
rate. The U.S. manufacturing index rose at a 3.7 percent rate in 1985-90, nearly
unchanged from its 1980-85 rate of 3.8 percent.
Some Statistical Evidence
A more systematic test of the deindustrialization hypothesis for Europe can
be conducted using the European manufacturing index shown in Chart 6. While a
comparable measure for the European exchange rate is more problematic, the
hypothesis above relates to the symmetry of effects of movements in the value of
the dollar. Thus, it is possible to test whether there is a systematic positive
17relationship between the nominal trade-weighted value of the U.S. dollar
(Chart 1) and European manufacturing output (Chart 6), as the deindustrialization
hypothesis suggests (or whether there is a significant negative relation as the
classical monetary or supply-side hypothesis suggests).’6
A strong test of the hypothesis is to examine the existence of a long-run
relationship between the value of the dollar (in TWEX) and European manufacturing
output (in M). An Engie-Granger cointegration test for this relationship was
conducted for the period 1/1960 to 1/1991, including alternative scale measures
for demand. The alternative scale measures include the logarithm of OECD real
COP (in XT) and the OECD unemployment rate (UNT), U.S. real COP (in X) and its
unemployment rate (UN~), and the OECD measures of European real GOP and
unemployment.
Only U.S. scale measures yielded a statistically significant cointegrating
vector estimate according to the Engle-Granger cointegration test that relies on
an augmented-Dickey-Fuller test. The estimates all include a time trend (t)
because the levels of some measures (1nLM and the logarithm of U.S. manufacturing
output) have significant trends even though they are not trend stationary, while
others (1nLXT and 1nLXF) have mixed results with the tests suggesting that they
are either characterized as having trend stationary growth rates, 1(2), or that
they are stationary, 1(0); unit roots are rejected for each of the latter
specifications, but the trend is statistically significant in the growth rate
test equations.’7 Finally, adding OECD measures or European measures was
“The test below was not conducted using the real exchange rate because the
sample period is much shorter (beginning in 1972) for this series. The two
exchange rate measures are highly correlated, however, at least for the period
since 1971.
‘7According to standard Dickey-Fuller tests, all the other variables are
1(1) except for the European unemployment rate which is 1(2).
18examined; only the addition of the logarithm of OECD output maintains the
significant cointegrating vector. The estimate is:
(1) mM -7.156 - 0.023 lnTWEX~ - 0.005 t + 2.696 lnXT~ - 1.489 inX
(-20.66) (-2.20) (-15.59) (34.71) (-12.91)
- 0.011UN~+R~
(-7.53)
— 0.998 S.E. — 0.0124 D.W. — 0.66
aL~ -0.421 Re.., + 0.102 AR~..,+ 0.207 bR~..2
(-5.39) (1.10) (2.34)
— 0.197 S.E. — 0.009 D.W. — 2.05
where R~ is the residual in the cointegrating vector and t-statistics are
indicated in parentheses. The Dickey-Fuller statistic for the critical
parameter, the lagged residual, in the test with two significant lagged dependent
variables is -5.39, which is below the critical value at a 5 percent significance
level of -4.86. Most importantly, the trade-weighted value of the dollar has a
long-run, negative relationship with European manufacturing output, contrary to
the deindustrialization hypothesis, but consistent with the supply-side
hypothesis.’8
Since the latter hypothesis relates to international changes in investment,
it is useful to look at this pattern as well. Table 5 shows simple percentage
changes in gross fixed capital formation for the U.S. and 11 European countries
18The same test was performed for U.S. manufacturing output. In this case,
only the U.S. real GOP and unemployment rate (in addition to the trend and
1nTWEX) enter a statistically significant (5 percent level) cointegrating vector.
In this case, 1nTWEX has a significant positive coefficient, again supporting the
supply-side hypothesis and decisively rejecting the deindustrialization
hypothesis. The coefficient is 0.043 (t = 3.65) and output and the unemployment
rate have their expected positive and negative coefficients, respectively.
19for the two periods. The pattern is again inconsistent with the
deindustrialization hypothesis. In 1985-90, European countries generally showed
a sharp acceleration in investment and their investment pace exceeded that in the
United States, where investment growth slowed sharply. In the earlier period,
U.S. investment grew much faster than in most European countries; this is also
inconsistent with the widespread view of declining U.S. competitiveness in the
early l980s.
Finally, the evidence in Table 3 can be used to more systematically assess
the exchange rate-competitiveness linkage. Table 6 provides evidence on the
correlation coefficients for the growth rates of manufacturing output shown in
Table 3 and the movements in the nominal and real exchange rates in Table 1 for
two groups of countries: Europe only and Europe excluding Portugal. Both time
periods are used and the number of observations are given in parentheses.
The most noteworthy feature in Table 6i sthat the correlations are
positive, not negative. The distinction between the nominal and real exchange
rate movements in the table makes little difference. Portugal had the second
largest manufacturing growth rate in 1985-90 and fourth largest in 1980-85, while
its exchange rate fell by the greatest amount in 1980-85 and nearly the most in
1985-90. When Portugal is excluded from the European countries, the positive
correlation for the nominal exchange rate gains in statistical significance. The
results in the table reject the conventional view both for Europe and for the
whole data set. They also fail to reject the hypothesized positive relationship
between the exchange rate and manufacturing output.
V. Conclusion
One of the greatest misconceptions about international economic policy and
developments during the past decade has been the view that a country’s exchange
20rate and its economic competitiveness bear a negative relationship to each other.
This hypothesis fostered the view that the rise in the dollar early in the l980s
deindustrialized the United States (and, by inference, boosted European or
non-U.S. competitiveness). It also fostered the view that policy actions to
lower a country’s currency value could boost the country’s competitiveness (and,
by inference, lower foreign competitiveness).
This article presents an alternative hypothesis based an classical monetary
and supply-side considerations. Under this hypothesis, exchange rate changes are
expected to reflect similar movements in competitiveness, so that policies that
boost the dollar do so, at least in part, because these same policies boost U.S.
competitiveness. Similarly, policies that can lower the dollar tend to do so
because they also lower U.S. competitiveness, or raise competitiveness abroad.
Changes in U.S. tax policy in the early 1980s raised incentives to invest
in the U.S. and not abroad. Such changes could be expected to raise investment,
productivity and output growth in the United States and lower these measures
abroad while raising the value of the dollar. Thus, the implied depreciation of
foreign currencies, including European ones, should have reflected the reduced
competitiveness of these countries. Similarly, the reversal of these tax
incentives in 1986 reversed these patterns and, therefore, contributed to a
decline in the dollar and rise in European competitiveness.
The empirical evidence reviewed here is strongly supportive of the tax
arguments and so rejects the deindustrialization hypothesis. In particular,
European countries apparently enjoyed a renaissance in competitiveness, as their
currencies generally appreciated from 1985 to 1990, following relatively stagnate
performance in the early 1980s when their currencies generally depreciated.
Output and investment both accelerated sharply in Europe in the late-l980s, while
21slowing in the United States. Similarly, in the early-l980s, European output and
investment were unusually weak and this was reflected in the weakness in their
currencies. Finally, some systematic statistical evidence is presented here
which shows that the value of the U.S. dollar has a statistically significant and
negative long-run influence on European manufacturing output, which is again
inconsistent with the deindustrialization view.
22REFERENCES
Belassa, Bela. “The Purchasing-Power Parity Doctrine: A Reappraisal,” Journal
of Political Eaonomy, 72 (December 1964), pp. 584-96.
_____ “Patterns of Industrial Growth: Comment,” American Economic Review, 51
(June 1961), pp. 344-97.
Branson, William. “The Limits of Monetary Coordination as Exchange Rate Policy,”
Brookinas Payers on Economic Activity, 1, 1986, pp. 175-94.
Branson, William and James Love. “U.S. Manufacturing and The Real Exchange
Rate,” in Richard Marston, ed., Misalfinment of Exchange Rates: Effects
on Trade and Industry. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988, pp.
241-70.
Brinner, Roger E. “The United States As An International Competitor,” in Impact
of the Dollar on U.S. Competitiveness, Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Economic Goals and Intergovernmental Policy of the Joint Economic
Committee, Ninety-Ninth Congress, 12 March 1985, S. Hearing 99-85, pp.
16-55.
Cline, William R. “Pressure for Import Protection and U.S. Policy,” in United
States Trade and Competitiveness, Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives,
Ninety-Ninth Congress, Serial No. 99-46, 1986, pp. 454-69.
23Frenkel, Jacob A. and Michael Mussa. “Asset Markets, Exchange Rates and the
Balance of Payments: The Reformulation of Doctrine,” in Ronald W. Jones
and Peter B. Kenen, eds., Handbook of International Economics, Volume II,
pp. 679-747. New York: North-Holland Press, 1985.
_____ and Assaf Razin. Fiscal Policy and the World Economy, 2nd ed., Cambridge,
Mass.: The MIT Press, 1992.
Giavassi, Francesco and Alberto Giovannini, Limitinz Exchanze Rate Flexibility,
Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1989.
Click, Reuven and Michael Hutchison. “Does Exchange Rate Appreciation,
‘Deindustrialize’ The Open Economy? A Critique of U.S. Evidence,”
Economic Inquiry (January 1990), pp. 19-37.
Cluck, Heinz, Dieter Proske and John A. Tatom. “Monetary and Exchange Rate
Policy in Austria: An Early Example of Policy Coordination,” paper
presented at the Workshop on Economic Policy Coordination, Central Bank of
Finland, Helsinki, 1992.
Hickok, Susan, Linda A. Bell and Janet Ceglowski. “The Competitiveness of U.S.
Manufactured Goods: Recent Changes and Prospects,” Federal Reserve
Bank of New York Quarterly Review (Spring 1988), pp. 7-22.
Hochreiter, Eduard and Georg Winckler. “Signaling A Hard Currency Strategy:
The Case of Austria,” presented at the Southern California Workshop on
24International Political Economy, Claremont McKenna College, Claremont,
California, April, 1991.
Koester, Reinhard B. and Roger C. Kormendi. “Taxation, Aggregate Activity and
Economic Growth: Cross-Country Evidence on Some Supply-Side Hypotheses,”
Economic Inquiry (July 1989), pp. 367-86.
Krugman, Paul R. “Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession,” Foreipn Affairs
(March/April 1994), pp. 28-44.
____ and Richard E. Baldwin. “The Persistence of the U.S. Trade Deficit,”
Brookings Payers on Economic Activity (1987:1), pp. 1-43.
Lawrence, Robert Z. “Is Trade Deindustrializing America? A Medium-Term
Perspective,” Brooking Papers on Economic Activity (1983:1), pp. 129-61.
“Can America Compete?” Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution,
1984.
Lipschitz, Leslie and Donogh McDonald. “Real Exchange Rates and
Competitiveness: A Clarification of Concepts and some Measurements for
Europe,” Empirica (1/1992), forthcoming.
Marris, Stephen. “Deficits and the Dollar: The World Economy at Risk,” Policy
Analyses in International Economics 14. Washington, D.C. : Institute for
International Economics, December 1985.
25Marston, Richard E. “Real Exchange Rates and Productivity Growth in the United
States and Japan,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper
#1922, May 1986.
Meyer, Stephen A. “Trade Deficits and the Dollar: A Macroeconomic
Perspective.” Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Business Review
(September/October 1986), pp. 15-25.
Mutti, John and Harry Grubert. “U.S. Taxes and Trade Performance,” National Tax
Journal (September 1988), pp. 317-25.
Ott, Mack. “Depreciation, Inflation and Investment Incentives: The Effects of
the Tax Acts of 1981 and 1982,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review
(November 1984), pp. 17-30.
Peterson, Peter C. “The Morning After,” The Atlantic Monthly (October 1987),
pp. 43-69.
Piggott, Charles, John Rutledge and Thomas D. Willett. “Estimating the
Inflationary Effects of Exchange Rate Changes,” in Sven W. Arndt, Richard
J. Sweeney and Thomas D. Willett, Exchange Rates. Trade and the U.S.
Economy, Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1985.
Razin, Assaf. “Capital Movements, Intersectoral Resource Shifts, and the Trade
Balance.” European Economic Review, October-November 1984, pp. 135-52.
26Sinn, Hans-Werner. “U.S. Tax Reform 1981 and 1986: Impact on International
Capital Flows,” National Tax Journal (September 1988), pp. 327-40.
Solomon, Robert. “Effects of the Strong Dollar,” in The U.S. Dollar-Recent
Developments, Outlook and Policy Options. Symposium sponsored by the
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, August 21-23,
1985, pp. 65-88.
Stockman, Alan C. and L.E.0. Svensson. “Capital Flows, Investment and Exchange
Rates,” Journal of Monetary Economics (March 1987), pp. 171-201.
Tatom, John A. “U.S. Investment in the 1980s: The Real Story,” Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis Review (March/April 1989), pp. 3-15.
______ “The Link Between the Value of the Dollar, U.S. Trade and Manufacturing
Output: Some Recent Evidence,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review
(November/December 1988), pp. 24-37.
* “Will A Weaker Dollar Mean A Stronger Economy?” Journal of
International Money and Finance (December 1987), pp. 433-47.
______ “Why Has Manufacturing Employment Declined?” Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis Review (December 1986b), pp. 15-25.
27“Domestic vs. International Explanations of Recent U.S. Manufacturing
Developments,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review (April
1986a), pp. 5-18.
______ “Two Views of the Effects of Government Budget Deficits in the l980s,”
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review (October 1985), pp. 5-16.
Volcker, Paul A. and Toyoo Gyohten. Changing Fortunes: The World’s Money and
The Threat to American Leadership, (New York: Times Books, 1992).
Winckler, Georg. “Exchange Rate Appreciation as a Signal of a New Policy




1985-90 1980-85 1985-90 1980-85
United States -35.0% 46.3% -25.5% 45.3%
Europe
Austria 9.9 3.7 -2.2 -9.4
Belgium 11.2 -17.3 3.1 13.6
Luxembourg 4.5 11.6 ---
Denmark 10.4 11.4 5.7V 1.6
Finland 5.5 1.4 13.5 1.2
France 4.8 -23.0 5.1 3.1
Germany 19.1 3.0 14.4 12.5
Italy 0.6 -27.0 6.7 -3.3
Ireland 7.1 -15.7 ---
Netherlands 14.8 0.2 -6.3 -4.8
Spain 8.0 -30.4 9.9 -8.9
Switzerland 13.0 12.2 10.4 4.9
Nominally Depreciating European Countries (1985-90)
Greece -40.9 -48.1 ---
Iceland -33.3 -82.1 ---
Norway -10.4 -4.8 6.1 -7.2
Portugal -23.9 -49.9 ---
Sweden -6.3 -21.3 7.6 -9.0
United Kingdom -8.8 -15.0 7.1 -9.6
1”Based on Export Unit Values; blanks indicate data are not available.
&‘The latest year available in 1988.
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics
29Table 2













IV/1983 179.0 ÷ + -
1/1985 132.2 - + -
1/1987 185.3 + --
111/1989 99.6 --÷
IV/l991 215.4 + --
30Table 3
Manufacturing Output Growth (Compound Annual Rates)
1980-85 1985-90 Change
United States 3.1% 3.7% 0.6%
Europe
Austria 1.4 2.5 1.1
Belgium 0.9 3.8 2.7
Luxembourg 4.2 3.2 -1.0
Denmark 2.5 -0.2 -2.7
Finland 2.9 2.6 -0.3
France -1.0 2.8 3.8
Germany 0.1 3.4 3.3
Greece 0.3 0.4 0.1
Ireland 5.5 8.4 2.9
Italy -0.8 3.2 4.0
Netherlands 1.8 3.3 1.5
Norway 0.8 0.6 -0.2
Portugal 3.2 4.9 1.7
Spain 0.3 3.3 3.0
Sweden 2.0 1.2 -0.8
Switzerland 0.5 3.8 3.3
United Kingdom 0.7 3.4 2.7
Sources: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics
31Table 4
The Increase of Export Prices: 1985-90 and 1980-85 (Implicit Price
Deflator)
1985-90 1980-85 Change
United States 1.9% 4.9% -3.0%
Europe
Austria 2.0 19.0 -17.0
Belgium -4.6 47.8 -43.2
Luxembourg 0.0 46.7 -46.7
Denmark -3.4 46.1 -42.7
Finland 8.9 36.3 -27.4
France 2.7 62.0 -59.3
Germany 2.6 18.6 -16.0
Greece 58.2 144.8 -86.6
Iceland 135.5 651.3 -515.8
Ireland -2.2 56.8 -59.0
Italy 12.5 82.3 -69.8
Netherlands -15.3 26.5 -41.8
Norway -4.3 38.8 -43.1
Portugal 48.8 182.6 -133.8
Spain 10.7 88.4 -77.7
Sweden 15.1 52.5 -37.4
Switzerland 10.8 20.0 -9.2
United Kingdom 8.4 41.4 -33.0
Source: OECD Annual National Accounts
32Table 5
Gross Fixed Capital Formation Increases in Selected Countries*
1985-90 1980-85 Change
United States 2,8% 20.0% -17.2%
Europe
Austria 27.3 -3.5 30.8
Belgium 57.5 -19.2 76.8
Luxembourg 73.6 -26.3 99.9
Denmark 4.1 12.0 -7.9
Finland 26.4 11.9 14.5
France 32.9 -6.2 39.1
Germany 28.8 -6.3 35.1
Greece 11.8 -10.3 22.1
Ireland 24.1 -13.7 37.8
Italy 22.7 -3.7 26.4
Netherlands 29.1 -1.7 30.8
Norway -16.1 6.0 -22.1
Portugal 64.1 -20.2 84.3
Spain 74.2 -7.0 81.2
Sweden 27.0 8.8 18.2
Switzerland 34.0 14.3 19.7
United Kingdom 32.6 13.0 19.6
*Volume Indices, 1985 100
33Table 6






European countries 0.298 (34)** 0.549 (25)*
European countries excluding
Portugal
0.439 (32)* 0.549 (25)*
*Significant at a 5 percent level
**Significant at a 10 percent level
34Chart 1
Index of the Nominal and Real Trade—Weighted
Dollar Exchange Rate













1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991
The real exchange rate measure uses trade—weighted consumer price indicesChart 2








1960 1964 ‘1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992Chart 3
Real Business Fixed Investment as a Share of Real GDP






1948 1952 1956 1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992Chart 4
Business Sector Output per Hour
$ Billion Quarterly Data








— Output in 1987 dollarsChart 5
asa
1962 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992
60
Total Trade of Europe and the U.S.









Source: International Financial StatisticsChart 6
1960 1965
Source: Organiz ation for Economic Cooper ation
and Development
150


















1970 1975 1980 1985 1990